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STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT COUNTY OF ALBANY 
In The Matter of PATRICK SUTHERLAND, 
Petitioner, 
-against- 
GEORGE B. ALEXANDER, CHAIRMAN OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE BOARD OF PAROLE, 
Respondent, 
For A Judgment Pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term 
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Court Justice Presiding 
RJI # 01-08-ST9019 Index No. 41 14-08 
Appearances : Patrick Sutherland 
Inmate No. 90-T-4 120 
Petitioner, Pro Se 
Shawangunk Correctional Facility 
P.O. Box 700 
Wallkill, NY 12589 
Andrew M. Cuomo 
Attorney General 
State of New York 
Attorney For Respondent 
1 he clapitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
(Dean J. Higgins, 
Assistant Attorney General 
of Counsel) 
DECISLON/OLU)ER/JCTDGMENT 
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice 
The petitioner, an inmate at Shawangunk Correctional Facility, has commenced the 
instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated August 
2 1,2008 to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner was convicted of 
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two counts of Burglary in the first degree, criminal possession of a weapon in the second 
dcgrcc, two counts of attcmpted assault in the second degree, attempted escape in the first 
degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree. Among the,many arguments 
set forth in the petition, the petitioner contends that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous 
information. He maintains that he is over the guideline range (see 9 NYCRR 800 1.3 [c]). He 
criticizes the Parole Board for failing to consider the criteria set forth in Executive Law 6 
2594. The petitioner points out that he has completed several institutional programs 
including Transitional Services, the Osborne Association, sobriety, basketball, legal research, 
HIV/AIDS/ ART and the SYPHUS program. He has worked as a legal general clerk, 
paralegal assistant, porter, and food service group porter. He maintains that the Parole 
Board failed to discuss the foregoing. In his view the Parole Board was interested in 
punishing him for his prior criminal convictions. He also maintains that the Parole Board 
failed to consider his institutional history or his plans upon being released. In the petitioner’s 
view, the Parole Board improperly focused on petitioner’s prior criminal convictions. The 
petitioner argues that the Parole Board’s determination was the result of an executive policy 
implemented by former Governor George Pataki to deny parole to violent felony offenders. 
The petitioner contends that as a result of the foregoing, his constitutional right to due 
process was violated. He accuses the Parole Board of being highly prejudiced against him, 
and maintains that the Board was unwilling to give him a fair and impartial analysis of his 
suitability for parole. This attitude, in his view, “stripped petitioner of any semblance of his 
rights to due process...”. 
The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole 
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sre set forth as follows: 
“Parole is denied. After a careful review of your record, your 
personal interview, and due deliberation, it is the determination 
of this panel that, if released at this time, there is a reasonable 
probability that you would not live at liberty without violating. 
the law. Your release at this time is incompatible with the 
welfare and safety of the community and will so deprecate the 
seriousness of the crime as to undermine respect for the law. 
This decision is based upon the following factors: You appear 
before this panel with serious instant offenses of burglary first, 
two counts; attempted assault second, two counts; criminal 
possession of a weapon third, two counts; and attempted escape 
first. While on parole only about four months, you shot at three 
victims with a handgun. You struck one victim in the arm. You 
have an extensive criminal history which include convictions for 
manslaughter first, robbery second and attempted assault 
second. You have a poor record of adjustment in prison which 
includes multiple Tier I11 infractions for prison misconduct. 
Consideration has been given to any program completion. 
However, your release at this time is denied.” 
As stated in Executive Law $2594 (2) (c) (A): 
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as 
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties 
while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable 
probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live and 
remain at liberty without violating the law, and that his release 
is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so 
deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect 
for law. In making the parole release decision, the guidelines 
adopted pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred 
fifty-nine-c of this article shall require that the following be 
considered: (i) the institutional record including program goals 
and accomplishments, academic achievements, vocational 
education, training or work assignments, therapy and 
interpersonal relationships with staff and inmates; (ii) 
performance, if any, as a participant in a temporary release 
program; (iii) release plans including community resources, 
employment, education and training and support services 
available to the inmate; (iv) any deportation order issued by the 
federal government against the inmate [I; (v) any statement 
made to the board by the crime victim or the victim’s 
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representative [I” (Executive Law $2594 [2] [c] [A]). 
“Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory 
requirements, not reviewable” (Matter of Sinopoli v Newr York State Board of Parols,l89 
AD2d 960,960 [3rd Dept., 19931, citing Matter of McKee v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 
157 AD2d 944). If the parole board’s decision is made in accordance with the statutory 
requirements, the board’s determination is not subject to judicial review (see Ristau v. 
Hammock, 103 AD2d 944 [3rd Dept., 19841). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality 
bordering on impropriety” on the part of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate 
judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting 
Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77 [ 19801). In the absence 
of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the discretionary determination made 
by the Parole Board (see Matter of Perez v. New York State of Division of Parole, 294 
AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021). 
The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its 
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the 
parole interview reveals that, in addition to the instant oitense, attention was paid to such 
factors as petitioner’s institutional programming and his plans upon release. The Parole 
Board took time to review a number of letters of support which were a part of his record. He 
was given ample opportunity to provide comments in support of his release. The decision 
was sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole and 
it satisfied the requirements of Executive Law 92594 (e Matter of Siao-Pao, 1 1 NY3d 773 
[2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 201 AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v. 
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New York State Division of Parole,.199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in 
fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate’s crimes and their 
violent nature (see Matter of Weir v. New York State Division of Parole, 205 AD2d 906,907 
[3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Sinopoli v .  New York State h a r d  of Parole. 189 AD2d 960, 
supra; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996), as well as the inmate’s 
criminal history (see Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629 [3rd Dept., 19971; Matter of 
Cohen v Gonzalez, 254 AD2d 556 [3rd Dept., 19981). The Parole Board is not required to 
enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in determining the inmate’s 
application, or to expressly discuss each one (see Matter of Wise v New York State Division 
of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3rd Dept., 20081). Nor must the parole board recite the precise 
statutory language set forth in the first sentence of Executive Law 6 2594 (2) ( c )  (A) (see 
Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd Dept., 20061). In other words, “[wlhere 
appropriate the Board may give considerable weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the 
circumstances of the crimes for which a petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s 
criminal history, together with the other statutory factors, in determining whether the 
individual ‘will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,’ whether his or her 
‘release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate 
the seriousness of [the] crime as to undermine respect for [the] law”’ (Matter of Durio v New 
York State Division ofParole. 3 AD3d 8 16 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $2594 
[2] [c] [A], other citations omitted). 
Petitioner’s claim that the Parole Board relied upon erroneous information relates to 
the followin; comment made by the Parole Board in its decision: “While on parole only 
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about four months, you shot at three victims with a handgun. You struck one victim in the 
arm” (emphasis supplied). The facts supporting the latter comment (that one victim was 
struck in the arm) are found in petitioner’s pre-sentence investigation report. The petitioner, 
however, has submitted evidence which appears to establish that charges with respect to the 
alleged shooting victim, identified as Manuel Pacheco, were dismissed by the trial court 
before verdict. The Court observes that the petitioner never called this matter to the attention 
of the Parole Panel during the parole interview, although the shooting was specifically 
mentioned. It is well settled that the Parole Board is entitled to rely upon the facts set forth 
in the inmate’s pre-sentence report (see Matter of Cox v New York State Division of Parole, 
11 AD3d 766, 767-768 [3rd Dept., 20041; see also Matter of Champion v Dennison, 40 
AD3d 1 18 1, 1 182 [3rd Dept., 20071, where it was held that such an issue is “foreclosed from 
review” where the inmate did not challenge the erroneous facts before the sentencing court). 
Moreover, a review of the record before the Court reveals, quite clearly, that this factor was 
not the sole basis of the Parole Board’s determination (see Matter of Nunez v Dennison, 5 1 
AD3d 1240, 1214 [3rd Dept., 20081; Matter of Fransua v Alexander, 52 AD3d 1140, 1141 
[3rd Uept., 20081). There were many other factors cited by the Parole Board which supported 
the determination which it reached. 
The record does not support petitioner’s assertion that the decision was predetermined 
consistent with an alleged executive branch policy mandating denial of parole to all violent 
felony offenders. The Court, accordingly, finds no merit to the argument (see Matter of 
Lue-Shing v Pataki, 301 AD2d 827, 828 [3rd Dept., 20031; Matter of Perez v State oi New 
York Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Jones v Travis, 293 
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AD2d 800,801 [3rd Dept., 20021; Matter of Little v Travis, 15 AD3d 698 [3rd Dept., 20051, 
Matter of Wood v Dennison, 25 AD3d 1056 [3rd Dept., 20061; Matter of Motti v Dennison, 
38 AD3d 1030, 103 1 [3rd Dep., 20071; Matter of Garofolo v Dennison, 53 AD3d 734 [3rd 
___ AD3d [3rd Dept., October 23, Dept., 20081; Matter of MacKenyie v Dennkon, 
200 81). 
With respect to petitioner's argument that he has served time in excess of the 
guideline range (see, 9 NYCRR 8001.3), the guidelines ''are intended only as a guide, and 
are not a substitute for the careful consideration of the many circumstances of each 
individual. case" (see, 9 NYCRR 8001.3 [a]; Matter of Tatta v State of New York Division 
of Parole, 290 AD2d 907,908 [3rd Dept., 20021). Thus, the Court finds that this does not 
serve as a basis to overturn the Board's decision. 
With regard to petitioner's arguments concerning an alleged violation of his right to 
due process, the Court first observes that there is no inherent right to parole under the 
constitution of either the United States or the State of New York (see Greenholtz v Inmates 
of the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 US 1, 7 [ 19791; Matter of Russo v 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 73, supra). It has been repeatedly held that 
Executive Law 5 2594 does not create in any prisoner an entitlement to, or a legitimate 
expectation of, release; therefore, no constitutionally protected liberty interests are implicated 
by the Parole Board's exercise of its discretion to deny parole (see Barna v Travis, 239 F3d 
169, 171 [2d Cir., 20011; Marvin v Goord, 255 F3d 40, 44 [2d Cir., 20011; Boothe v 
Hammock, 605 F2d 66 1,664 [2d Cir., 19793; Paunetto v Hammock, 5 16 F Supp 1367,1367- 
1368 [SD NY, 19811; Matter ofKusso v New York Stare Bci. ol-Yarole, 50 NY2d 69,75-76, 
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sur>ra, Matter of Gamez v Dennison, 18 AD3d 1099 [3rd Dept., 20051; Matter of Lozada v 
New York State Div. of Parole, 36 AD3d 1046, 1046 [3rd Dept., 20071). The Court, 
accordingly, finds no due process violation. 
In addition, the Parole Board's decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24 
months) is within the Board's discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta 
v State3f New Yrvk Divkim --- nf Parnlc, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98 
NY2d 604). 
The Court has reviewed petitioner's remaining arguments and contentions and finds 
them to be without merit. 
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of 
lawhl procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The 
petition must therefore be dismissed. 
Accordingly, it is 
ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed. 
This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. All papers are 
returned to the attorney for the respondent who is directed to enter this 
DecisiodOrder/Judgment without notice and to serve petitioner with a copy of this 










Order To Show Cause dated June 3,20,08, Petition, Supporting Papers and 
Exhibits 
Respondent’s Answer dated July 24,2008, Supporting Papers and Exhibits 
Reply Affidavit sworn to August 5,2008 
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